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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
The Osborne rule, they claim, is based on the presumption that the settlor
intended to confer every benefit upon the income beneficiary since normally
the life beneficiary is the principal object of the settlor's bounty. They also
point out that "Capital, capital surplus, and earned surplus are merely bookkeeping entries on the records of the corporation. They cannot govern the
substantive rights of those interested in a trust. What is capital to the
corporation, may be income to the trust, and what is income to an ordinary
' 30
shareholder may be corpus to a trust shareholder.
This was rejected by the majority of the Court which felt that the Osborne
rule was designed as a safeguard on the rights of principal and a limitation on
the rights of income. Even though a corporation may have sufficient earnings
subsequent to the creation of the trust to cover the distribution, the nature
and source of the dividend must be considered and the court will not assume
the distribution come from earned surplus. For example, extraordinary distributions of corporate property acquired by the corporation before the creation of
the trust or a distribution of earnings accumulated before the trust was created
should go to trust principal. On the other hand, when earned surphs is
capitalized and stock issued, this stock may be allocated to income on the
theory that the stock dividend is in essence a distribution of earnings even
though the earnings are being retained in the corporation. This rule is advantageous to the income beneficiary in that it gives him a proportionate interest in all the capital assets; and it is also possible for the value of the stock
distributed to be greater than the earnings capitalized. Also where the trustee
has a slight majority of the voting stock giving him control of the corporation,
it would be possible by allocating a stock dividend to income to shift the
control of the corporation away from the trustee. Therefore, the rule should
be limited to its present application.
In the instant case, since the applicability of the Osborne rule was not put
in issue by the parties, the result reached by the majority is justified. However, the fundamental difficulty lies in the acceptance of the rule itself regardless of which interpretation it is given. The New York Legislature recognized
the fact when it passed Section 17(a) of the Personal Property Law. Unfortunately, this only covers extraordinary dividends of stock to trusts created
after 1926. It is submitted that if the applicability of the Osborne rule comes
squarely before the court it should be overruled-in favor of a rule more in
line with the present legislative declaration.
PAYMENTS TO ESTATE BENEFICIARIES BEHIND THE IRON CU-RTAIN

In re Geiger's Estate3 l was an appeal from a refusal to release funds from
an estate for the purpose of sending relief packages to estate distributees in
30. Id. at 23, 194 N.Y.S.2d 481 (dissent).
31.

7 N.Y.2d 109, 195 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1959),

a 5-2 decision, the minority dissenting

to both the holding denying the assignment and the refusal of a hearing to permit release
of the funds for the beneficiaries.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Hungary. Section 269 of the then Surrogate's Court Act stated in effect that
where it shall appear that a beneficiary would not have the use of the money
or property due him the Surrogate may direct that it be paid into court.32 The
Surrogate on being presented with this case took judicial notice of the situation
in Hungary and stated that he "[did] not believe it likely that the beneficiaries
would have use or control of the property . . ." and further that "The courts
do not favor purported assignments of funds payable to iron-curtain country
nationals and have labeled them attempts to circumvent section 269 of the
Surrogate's Court Act. '"3
It appears that this Surrogate, as others, 34 feared that had he released
the funds they would "ultimately percolate in a roundabout way into the
country behind the iron curtain" to the benefit of the country, 35 and not the
individual. The Appellate Division,36 and the Court of Appeals, 37 affirmed,
fortified in all probability by a deference to the Surrogate's discretion. The
minority felt that the Surrogate had abused his discretion in taking judicial
notice of the situation without affording the petitioner a hearing and a chance
therein to show that the money would inure to the benefit of the distributees.
Section 269 has been amended since this case by the addition of Section
269 (a) (2),s which places the burden in a questionable case on the person seeking the funds to show that the alien beneficiary will receive the benefit, use or
control of the money. The Legislature appears to have accepted the viewpoint
of the Surrogate in the present case and solidified it into a statute. But in so
doing they seem to have limited somewhat the discretion of the Surrogate,
since now he would appear precluded from releasing the funds where the distributees do not justify such a release by a preponderance of the evidence.
There was also involved an appeal by the attorney individually to obtain
enforcement of an assignment of 25% of the beneficiaries' share of the estate
for legal services rendered. The Court of Appeals ruled that the attorney could
not recover on the assignment since it was an assignment of the shares over
which the distributees had no control. But, the Court did indicate that on a
proper proceeding a reasonable fee chargeable against the fund might be
obtainable for services rendered. 39
32.

N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act § 269 (now § 269(a) (1)).

33.

12 Misc. 2d 1043, 1044, 175 N.Y.S.2d 588, 589 (Surr. Ct. 1958).

34. In re Braier's Estate, 305 N.Y. 148, 111 N.E.2d 424 (1953); In re Siegler's Will,
284 App. Div. 436, 132 N.Y..2d 392 (3d Dep't 1954); In re Herz' Will, 7 Misc. 2d 217,
163 N.Y-S.2d 349 (Surr. Ct. 1957); In re Perlinsky's Estate, 202 Misc. 351, 115 N.YS.2d
549 (Surr. Ct. 1952); In re Getream, 200 Misc. 543, 107 N.Y.S.2d 225 (Surr. Ct. 1951);
In re Alexandroff, 183 Misc. 95, 47 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Surr. Ct. 1944) (Surrogate Foley).
35. In re Getream, 200 Misc. 543, 544, 107 N.Y.S.2d 225, 226 (Surr. Ct. 1951).
36. 7 A.D.2d 1004, 185 N.Y.S.2d 227 (2d Dep't 1959). Unanimous on denying the
releasing of funds to the distributees in Hungary and 3-2 on denying the 25% assignment
to the local attorney.
37. Supra note 31.
38. N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act § 269(a) (2) as amended N.Y. Sess. Laws 1960, ch. 975.
39. See N.Y. Surr. CL Act § 231(b).

